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Karl H. Seethaler 
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Linda Call 
All three Plaintiffs/Appellants filed with this Court Appellants Emerys1 Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal and Appellant Seethaler fs Stipulation to Dismissal and Appellants 
Emerysf Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal, both of which were dated 
May 12, 2008. 
In an Order of Dismissal dated May 20, 2008, this Court dismissed this appeal. 
However, on May 27, 2008, this Court issued its Order dismissing Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Lawrence P. Emery and Jennifer J. Emery from this appeal. 
PARTIES ON APPEAL 
Appellant: Karl H. Seethaler 
Appellee: Don W. Call and Linda Call 
REFERENCES T O PARTIES AND CITATIONS T O RECORD 
Plaintiff/Appellant Karl H Seethaler will be referred to herein as "Mr. Seethaler." 
Plaintiff Lawrence P. Emery will be referred to herein as "Mr. Emery." 
Defendants/Appellees Don W. Call and Linda Call will be referred to herein as " 
the Calls." Mr. Call individually will be referred to as "Mr. Call." 
For the sake of convenience, this Brief of Appellees' will use the same system of 
citations to the record used in the Brief of Appellants. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
List of all Parties Below i 
Table of Authorities iv 
Jurisdiction of the Court Of Appeals 1 
Issues Presented for Review and Standard of Review 1 
Issue No. 1 1 
Issue No. 2 1 
Issue No. 3 1 
Standard of Review 1 
Preservation of Issues 3 
Citations of Determinative Provisions of Law 3 
Statement of the Case 4 
Nature of the Case 4 
Course of Proceedings 5 
Disposition in the Court Below 7 
Statement of Facts 11 
Summary of Argument 19 
Argument 20 
I. Given its findings on the disputed boundary, the trial court crafted 
appropriate equitable remedies below 20 
II. Mr. Seethaler did not preserve his claim of "irreparable harm/' and 
he invited the remedy of money damages 25 
-n-
III. Mr. Seethaler's cases do no support his assertion that he is entitled to 
a different form of equitable relief 27 
IV. The Calls are not responsible for Mr. Seethaler's parking problems 32 
V. Mr. Seethaler did not marshal the evidence to support his challenge 
to a key finding of fact that all the parties acted in good faith 34 
VI. Mr. Seethaler did not preserve his claim of de facto condemnation 38 
Conclusion 39 
Addendum 
Portion of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 36 (Hansen Survey) showing parcels at issue A-l 
-in-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Carrier v. Lindquist 
2001 UT 105, 37.3d 1112 26, 27, 29 
Chen v. Stewart 
2004 UT82, 100 P.3d 1177 35 
Hughes v. Cafferty 
2004 UT22, 89P.3dl48 23 
Hunsaker v.Kersh 
991 P.2d 67 28 
Johnson v. Hermes Associates, LTD 
2005 UT 82, 128 P.3d 1151 26 
Myrahv. Campbell 
2007 UT App. 168, 163 P.3d 679 25, 29, 38 
Ockey v. Lehmer 
2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51 22 
Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates 
535 P.2d 1256 (UT 1975) 27, 31 
Parduhn v. Bennett 
2005 UT 22, 112 P.3d 495 35, 40 
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat 7 Bank 
307 U.S. 161, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939) 24 
State v. Pena 
869P.2d932 (UT 1994) 23 
Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City 
918P.2d870 (UT1996) 27 
Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon 
669 P.2d 421 (UT 1983) 27 
iv 
Thurston v. Box Elder County 
892 P.2d 1034 (UT 1995) 23 
United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co. 
UT 2003 49, 79 P.3d 945 2 
v 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Calls agree with Mr. Seethaler's statement of jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Calls rephrase the issues as follows. 
ISSUE NO. 1 
In the long-fought and difficult boundary dispute below, the trial court crafted 
multiple equitable remedies after taking into account the parties' actions, the 
circumstances surrounding those actions and the resulting "mess." Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion by leaving a cement wall in place and allowing the Calls 
to use a sliver of real property on their side of the wall even though the sliver of 
land was on Mr. Seethaler's side of the boundary that the court had previously 
found to be established by deed and boundary by acquiescence? 
ISSUE N O . 2 
Did Mr. Seethaler raise and preserve in the trial court his claim of "irreparable 
harm"? 
ISSUE N O . 3 
Was the trial court's finding of fact in an equitable proceeding that "all parties in 
this matter acted in good faith and no party acted in bad faith"1 clearly erroneous 
because of insufficient evidence to support that finding? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In this appeal from an equity proceeding, the "trial court's determination of the law 
is reviewed under a correctness standard;" this Court should "afford no degree of 
1
 Interim Findings 2007, R at 427, f 1. 
1 
deference to a trial judge's determination of the law."2 
As stated by the Supreme Court in an appeal from an equity proceeding: 
A trial court's findings of fact will be upheld unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Although legal questions are reviewed for 
correctness, we "may still grant a trial court discretion in its 
application of the law to a given fact situation." We decide how 
much discretion to give a trial court in applying the law to a 
particular area by considering a number of factors 'pertinent to 
the relative expertise of appellate and trial courts in addressing 
those issues." Finally, "a trial court is accorded considerable latitude 
and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy," and 
will not be overturned unless it abused its discretion. 
(Emphasis added; citations omitted.)3 
Accordingly, as to the Calls' Issue No. 1, the standard of review is "abuse of 
discretion." As to the Calls' Issue No. 2, there is no standard of review because Mr. 
Seethaler did not raise this claim below and the trial court did not rule on it. As to the 
Calls' Issue No. 3, the standard of review is "clearly erroneous." 
The Calls dispute Mr. Seethaler's third issue (regarding an alleged de facto 
condemnation of his property) and the correctness standard of review that he suggests 
should be applied. As noted above, "'a trial court is accorded considerable latitude 
and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy/' and will not be 
overturned unless it abused its discretion." (Emphasis added, f 
2
 United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, \ 9, 
79P.3d945,948. 
3
 Id. 
"Id. 
2 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
Mr. Seethaler's claim in his brief that he was "irreparably harmed"5 by the 
equitable remedies crafted by the trial court at the November 28, 2006 equity trial was 
never raised before the trial court - either before or during the equity trial or in the 14 
months between the time of the equity trial and the court's issuance of its Final Judgment 
and Decree and plaintiffs' filing of their Notice of Appeal6 Nor was Mr. Seethaler's third 
issue - regarding an alleged de facto right of condemnation - ever raised before the trial 
court.7 
The proceedings below were before the trial court sitting in equity. Accordingly, 
the issues framed by the Calls were addressed by the court and preserved in the various 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.8 
CITATIONS OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The Calls agree with Mr. Seethaler that there are no constitutional, statutory or 
regulatory provisions that are determinative of the appeal or of central importance in this 
matter. 
5
 Brief of Appellant, pp. 15-16, 18-19. 
6
 R. at pp. 284-487; 2006 T.; 4/2/2007 T.; 7/9/2007 T.; 11/19/2007 T. 
"Id. 
8
 Findings 2005, R.at 195-214; Interim Findings 2007, R. at 437-436; 2008 Final 
Findings R. at 477-479. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Calls strenuously object to Mr. Seethaler's misleading assertions in his 
Statement of the Case that the trial court's various findings of fact "collectively found 
Calls knowingly built an encroaching wall on Seethaler's property" and that the wall was 
"knowingly and intentionally built by the Calls on [Mr.] Seethaler's property."9 The trial 
court never made such a finding in any of its 144 separate findings of fact in three 
different documents and oral findings at the conclusion of trial proceedings.10 Indeed, 
these statements are contradicted by the trial court's very first finding of fact in its Interim 
Supplemental rindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law\n 
1. The Court finds that all parties in this matter acted in 
good faith and that no party acted in bad faith. 
As discussed at some length below, the Calls obtained a survey from a licensed 
surveyor in November 2001 and proceeded to develop the north end of their parcel (the 
"Call Property") in accordance with the boundary set by that survey. Although Mr. 
Seethaler and the Emery plaintiffs obtained their own survey some seven to eight months 
afterwards, no one could possibly know where the disputed boundary would ultimately be 
9
 Brief of Appellant, pp. 4, 8. 
10
 Findings 2005, R. at 195-214; Interim Findings 2007, R. at 437-436; Final 
Findings R. at 477-479; T. Vol. Ill, pp. 
11
 Interim Findings 2007, R. at 437. 
4 
set until the trial court made that determination on July 1, 2004 at the conclusion of a 2 Vi-
day bench trial. 
Course of Proceedings 
In the trial court, Mr. Seethaler was one of three plaintiffs who sued the Calls in 
this boundary dispute.12 The other plaintiffs, Lawrence and Jennifer Emery (husband and 
wife), own two parcels of real property (the "Emery Property") that adjoin both Mr. 
Seethaler's real property (the "Seethaler Property") and the Call Property.13 The Emerys 
stayed involved in this case through the Final Judgment and Decree issued by the trial 
court. In addition, the Emerys accepted payments from the Calls of court-awarded 
damages, joined Mr. Seethaler in submitting the Notice of Appeal,14 and then moved this 
Court to withdraw from the appeal15 - which motion was granted.16 
In their Complaint, the plaintiffs brought one tort claim - trespass - emd three 
equitable claims: 1) boundary by acquiescence; 2) prescriptive easement for use of land; 
and 3) prescriptive easement for drainage.17 It appears from the transcript of the 2004 
12
 Complaint, R at 3-9. 
13
 Id. 
14
 R. at 487. 
15
 R at 461- 462, 480-482, R 483; this Court's Order of Dismissal dated May 20, 
2008. 
16
 Order of Dismissal dated May 20, 2008. 
17
 Complaint, R at 3-9. 
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bench trial that the plaintiffs' trespass claim was limited to seeking damages for six box 
elder trees that were removed by Mr. Call and two spruce trees on the Emery Property 
that might have been harmed by the construction of the cement wall and the dumping of 
additional soil on the Calls' side of the wall.18 
At the conclusion of a 2 Vi-day trial in the summer of 2004, the plaintiffs prevailed 
on their pleaded claims of: 1) boundary by acquiescence; 2) prescriptive easement for 
drainage; and 3) trespass (to the extent damages were ultimately awarded for losses 
related to trees).19 In addition, the plaintiffs prevailed on one claim not pleaded: 4) 
boundary by deed and survey.20 All of the Calls' causes of action in their counterclaim 
were dismissed by the trial court at the conclusion of the first 2 V2-day trial.21 
In effect, the trial court bifurcated the case, holding a 2 ^-day bench trial on 
liability issues and tree damages in the summer of 2004 and conducting equity 
proceedings on November 28, 2006 and November 19, 2007 to determine remedies for 
the plaintiffs' equitable claims, including matters related to the boundary dispute, the 
cement wall and drainage.22 However, both the November 28, 2006 and November 19, 
18
 T. Vol. Ill, p. 67. 
19
 2005 Findings, R. at 195-215; 2005 Judgment, R. at 189-194. 
20Id. 
21
 2005 Judgment, R at 194, f 10. 
22
 T. Vol. Ill, pp. 68, 112; 2006 T., p. 2. 
6 
2007 equity proceedings also involved the trial court making adjustments to the damages 
for the two spruce trees on the Emery Property.23 
Disposition in the Court Below 
In the trial court, the issue of the parties' good faith versus bad faith was raised 
multiple times. During the November 28, 2006 equity proceedings, the trial court 
stated:24 
Here's the problem. Both sides suggest that they coached, for 
lack of a better term, their surveyors. . . . I'm not going to conclude 
that one survey or another was drawn because somebody suggested 
that this is where it ought to be. That simply accuses these surveyors 
of impropriety. I don't think there's any evidence that either of them 
have been. I think the evidence si that they all did the best job 
possible and I have to make a decision on which one to rely on. 
I will make a finding right now, in anticipation of a final 
decision, that I find no bad faith on either part in this case. 
There's a deplorable lack of communication and I think a fairly 
deplorable lack of cooperation, but not motivated by any bad faith. I 
think both parties acted in their self-interest, but I think they did so in 
good faith. 
I'm going to make a finding here that neither party acted in what I 
consider bad faith. I think both parties acted in good faith. There 
could have been more communication. {Emphasis added.) 
At the conclusion of nearly five years of litigation between the parties below, the 
trial court's bottom-line disposition of all the issues was as follows: 
23
 Interim Findings 2006, R. at 439, 441-442, <H 14, 23-24; Final Findings 2007, R. 
at 477. 
24
 2006 T., pp. 124, 139, 145. 
7 
• The trial court found in equity "that all parties in this matter acted in good 
faith and that no party acted in bad faith."25 
• The survey performed by the plaintiffs surveyor was recorded as "reflecting 
the property lines and boundaries between the Seethaler and Call property and the Emery 
and Call property, respectively."26 
• The cement wall constructed by Mr. Call between the Seethaler Property 
and the Call Property was found at trial to lie on Mr. Seethaler's side of the 
boundary line as determined by the plaintiffs' surveyor and accepted by the trial court to 
be the correct boundary line.27 
• In fashioning equitable remedies, the trial court found that: "It is not 
equitable or appropriate to order removal of the cement wall as erected by the 
Defendants on what has been determined to be the Plaintiffs1 property because it is 
economically unfeasible and unreasonable to require removal of the wall and 
because of the cost to rebuild the wall a few feet away."28 Accordingly, the trial court 
found that it is "equitable to leave the property ownership as it is currently, with 
occupancy of the property from the cement wall south to be by the [Calls]. 
25
 Interim Findings 2007, R. at 437, f 1. 
262007 Interim Judgment, R. at 433; see also 2005 Judgment, R. at 192. 
27
 2005 Findings, R. at 189-194; 2007 Interim Findings, R. at 437-446. 
28
 2007 Interim Findings, R. at 438, f 2 (emphasis added.). 
8 
Occupancy of the cement wall north shall be by the Plaintiffs (Mr. Seethaler and the 
Emerys)."29 
• In accordance with the trial court's equitable remedies, the Calls paid Mr. 
Seethaler $8,900 for use of the 612 square of his property that the trial court found was 
south of the cement wall but north of the boundary line determined by the plaintiffs' 
surveyor and accepted by the court.30 
• In accordance with the trial court's equitable remedies, the Calls paid Mr. 
Seethaler an additional $500 for 20 years of anticipated property taxes for the 612 square 
feet of real property south of the cement wall.31 
• In accordance with the trial court's equitable remedies, the Calls paid the 
Emery plaintiffs $6,750 for 400 square feet of their property that the trial court found was 
south of the cement wall but north of the boundary line determined by the plaintiffs' 
surveyor and accepted by the trial court.32 
• In accordance with the trial court's equitable remedies, the Calls paid the 
Emery plaintiffs an additional $400 for 20 years of anticipated property taxes for the 400 
29
 2007 Judgment, R. at 433; 2007 Findings, R. at 438, f 1 (emphasis added). 
30
 R. at 461; 2007 Interim Judgment at 433; 2007 Interim Findings at 439. 
31
 R. at 461; 2007 Interim Judgment at 433; 2007 Interim Findings at 439, 440. 
32
 R. at 461; 2007 Interim Judgment at 433; 2007 Interim Findings at 439. 
9 
square feet of real property south of the cement wall. 
• Apparently in relation to the plaintiffs' trespass claim, the Calls paid the 
plaintiffs a total of $18,715 for removal of six box elder trees and anticipated damage to 
two large fir trees.34 
»• The trial court found that the Calls were responsible for managing drainage 
of water from the plaintiffs' properties because the trial court determined that the 
plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement to drain water onto the Call Property.35 In 
accordance with the trial court's equitable remedies, the Calls paid the plaintiffs $3,384 
to build a sump that would handle drainage of water that, before construction of the 
cement wall, had flowed onto the Call Property.36 
» Ruling in equity, the trial court awarded the Emery plaintiffs perpetual use 
of one parking space on the Calls property to replace the use of one of the Emery s1 
parking spaces that the trial court found was lost as a result of construction of the 
concrete wall.37 
33
 R. at 461; 2007 Judgment at 433; 2007 Findings at 439, 440. 
34
 2007 Judgment, R. at 216 
35
 2005 Findings, R. at 208, If 103; 2007 Findings, R. at 438, ffif 9-13; 2007 Decree, 
R. at 433,1| 4. 
36
 R. at 461; 2007 Judgment at 433; 2007 Findings at 439, ^ 13. 
37
 2007 Interim Findings, R. at 440, ^ 19; 2007 Interim Judgment, R. at 433,1f 10. 
10 
• As directed by the Court, the Calls paid the plaintiffs' court costs of 
$1,218.38 
• In total, the Calls have paid the plaintiffs the foil $39,867 awarded by the 
trial court as damages for the plaintiffs' various claims.39 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties to this lawsuit own adjoining parcels of real property in Logan, 
on which are located three different apartment complexes.40 
2. Since 1988, the Emery plaintiffs have owned two fourplex units that were 
constructed in the late 1960s and are known as the Island Inn Apartments.41 Since 1988, 
Mr. Seethaler has owned a 36-unit apartment complex that was constructed in 1972 and is 
known as Cambridge Court.42 
3. In 1993, the Calls began to develop fourplex apartment buildings on the 
Call Property by obtaining a survey from Wayne Crow (the "Crow Survey"), having a site 
plan prepared, and obtaining permits from Logan City.43 At the time, the Call Property 
38
 R. at 461; 2007 Interim Judgment at 433; 2007 Interim Findings at 439. 
39
 R. at 216, 461, 483. 
40
 2005 Findings, R. at 197, ^  4; T. Vol. I, pp. 62-63. 
41
 T. Vol. I at 35, 62-63, 88-89. 
42
 2005 Findings, R. at p. 197, If 1f 5,6; T Vol. I, pp. 11, 21, 
43
 2005 Findings, R. at 197, ^  10. 
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was unimproved pasture land and the development of the Calls' apartments was a part-
time project for Mr. Call, who was then working as a school teacher.44 In 1993, Logan 
City authorized Mr. Call to construct five fourplex apartment units on the Call Property.45 
4. The 1993 Crow Survey identified an existing fence line as the boundary 
between the Call Property to the south and the Seethaler Property and Emery Property to 
the north.46 
5. In 1994, Mr. Call spoke with Plaintiff Larry Emery and Mr. Seethaler about 
the Call Property, explaining his development plans and discussing drainage issues.47 
6. In 1994, the Calls began constructing apartment buildings on the south side 
of the Call Property - which is on the opposite side of the property from the boundary 
with the Seethaler Property and the Emery Property.48 
7,. In the fall of 2001, Mr. Call commissioned Lane Smith ("Mr. Smith") of 
Knighton and Crow to perform a new survey (the "Smith Survey") of the Call Property 
because the 1993 Crow Survey showed the northeast side of the Call Property was 
approximately 2 feet short of the property described in the metes and bounds description 
T. Vol. I, p. 128; 2006 T., p. 26; 
T. Vol. I, pp. 131-132. 
2005 Findings, R. at 197, ^  10. 
T. Vol. I, p. 38; 2006 T., pp. 25-26, 52-53; 
2005 Findings, R. at 197,^9; 
12 
of the Calls' deed and Mr. Call could not find a survey pin from the Crow Survey on the 
northwest side of the Call Property.49 
8. In retaining Mr. Smith to conduct the Smith Survey, Mr. Call did not 
instruct Mr. Smith to find a particular boundary line on the north side of the Call 
Property.50 Rather, Mr. Call noted that the 1993 Crow Survey appeared to follow a fence 
line on the north side of the Call Property and the Crow Survey left the Call Property with 
approximately 2 feet less property than was called out in the metes and bounds 
description of the warranty deed to the Call Property that Mr. Call's mother had executed 
in favor of the Calls.51 Mr. Call requested that Mr. Smith find the property lines as set 
forth in the parties' respective deeds and take any deficiency, if any was found to exist, 
from the Call Property.52 
9* In November 2001, Mr. Smith staked out the northern boundary of the Call 
Property as he had determined it to be from his survey that month.53 Mr. Smith testified 
at trial that the Smith Survey provided the full amount of real property described in 
the metes and bounds descriptions of the deeds to the parcels that are affected by this 
9
 T. Vol. I, p. 129, 136; 2006 T., pp. 102-103. 
0
 T. Vol. II, pp. 136, 140-156; 2006 T. pp. 103-104. 
1
 T. Vol. I, pp. 129, 135 ; T. Vol. II, p. 142. 
2
 T. Vol. I, pp. 135-136, T. Vol. II, pp. 142-143; 2006 T., pp. 103-104. 
3
 T 11/28/07, p. 26-27, 54 
13 
boundary dispute. 
10. In November 2001, Mr. Call placed metal fence posts at regular interval 
along the northern boundary line (between the Call Property on the south and the Emery 
Property and Seethaler Property on the north) as that boundary had been determined and 
staked by Mr. Smith.55 
11. In November 2001, Mr. Call removed the remainder of an old fence that 
was leaning on his side of the boundary staked by Mr. Smith.56 
12. There was considerable conflict in the testimony at trial about the location 
of the old boundary-line cedar fence and whether there was a second, newer fence that 
had been constructed south (on the Calls' side) of the old fence. On one hand, Mr. Call 
recalled that in the 1980s his family (which then owned the Call Property) had 
constructed a new fence south of the original fence, and it was that fence that was 
incorrectly used in the Crow Survey to determine the boundary line.57 In addition, Logan 
City Building Inspector John Chase, concrete contractor Steve Johnson and Mr. Call all 
testified at trial that there was evidence of old fence posts in the trench Mr. Call dug for 
54
 T. Vol. II, pp. 142-143. 
55
 Id. 
56
 T. Vol. I, pp. 21-22, 24-25, 64, 
57
 T. Vol. I, pp. 151-156. 
14 
the footings for the cement wall at issue.58 On the other hand, former apartment owner 
Sherwood Kirby, Mr. Seethaler and Mr. Emery all testified they believed that the 
dilapidated fence that was removed in November 2001 was the boundary-line fence.59 
Ultimately, the trial court found that "[o]nly one Fence Line existed, and the Crow Survey 
and Hansen Survey both accurately described the location of that Fence Line.60 
13. In November 2001, Mr. Call invited Mr. Seethaler and Mr. Emery to meet 
with Mr. Call to discuss, based on a Mr. Smith's survey, a discrepancy in the parties1 
respective deeds as to their boundary line.61 There is a dispute in the record as to whether 
Messrs. Seethaler and Emery objected to Mr. Call's description of the boundary line as 
determined by Mr. Smith; Messrs. Seethaler and Emery testified they objected to the 
Smith boundary, Mr. Call testified they did not express any concerns before he 
constructed the cement wall in the spring of 2002.62 Ultimately, the trial court found that 
"[t]he Defendants and their predecessors in interest never claimed the Fence Line to be 
anything other than a boundary line.'*3 
58
 T. Vol I, pp 151-157 ;T. Vol. II, pp. 119, 122, 125-126, 132-136. 
59
 T. Vol I, pp. 14-16, 21, 53-54, 62-65, 106; 2006 T., p. 55 
60
 2005 Findings, R. at 204,170. 
61
 T. Vol. I, pp. 22, 52, 65, 78, 137-139; 2006 T., pp. 26-29; 54-58. 
62
 T. Vol. I, pp. 137-139; 2006 T, pp. 27-28, 54-57, 104-105. 
63
 2005 Findings, p. 201, f 32. 
15 
14. As of November 2001, the Seethaler Property had not been surveyed while 
under Mr. Seethaler's ownership.64 
15. In late March or early April 2002, Mr. Call constructed a cement wall 
between the Call Property on the south and the Emery Property on the North.65 
16. On April 11, 2002 - when he was notified by Messrs. Emery and Seethaler 
that they believed the cement wall was not on the Call Property and that there were 
drainage issues that must be resolved - Mr. Call ceased all work on his apartment project 
at the north side of the Call Property so that he could resolve these issues with Messrs. 
Seethaler and Emery.66 
17. Mr. Call arranged a meeting on May 13, 2002 between Mr. Emery, Mr. 
Seethaler, Mr. Smith and himself to discuss the results of the Smith Survey and the 
northern boundary of the Call Property.67 
18. Messrs. Seethaler and Emery delivered to Mr. Call a letter dated May 28, 
2002 objecting to Mr. Call proceeding with construction of his apartment project without 
first obtaining a "Boundary Agreement" with Messrs. Seethaler and Call.68 
64
 T. Vol. 1, p. 47. 
65
 2005 Findings, R. at 199, % 19; T. Vol. I, p. 64; 2006 T., pp. 31, 106, 110. 
66
 2006 T., p. 118. 
67
 2006 T., pp. 31-32, 111-112, 116-117. 
68
 Plaintiffs' Ex. 23, which is Exhibit E in Addendum to Brief of Appellant; T. Vol. 
I, p. 28. 
16 
19. In late June 2002, Mr. Seethaler and Mr. Emery retained Jeff Hansen ("Mr. 
Hansen") to perform a survey (the "Hansen Survey") that would determine the boundary 
line between the Call Property and their respective parcels.69 The Hansen Survey was 
completed on July 15, 2002.70 
20. Except for receiving loads of fill dirt in June 2002, Mr. Call did not perform 
any work on his apartment project until September 2002 because he was waiting to 
resolve the boundary dispute with Messrs. Seethaler and Emery, who never made any 
proposals or effort to resolve the dispute during the summer of 2002.7l 
21. In the March 2003, Mr. Call constructed the cement wall between the Call 
Property and the Seethaler Property.72 Before constructing that portion of the cement wall 
- which was inside the boundary set by the Smith Survey but outside boundary set by the 
Hansen Survey - Mr. Call consulted with his then-attorney, Ray Malouf, and officials 
with the Logan City.73 
22. On March 31, 2003, the plaintiffs filed their Complaint against the Calls. 
2006 T., pp. 29 
2005 Findings, R. at 198, f 14. 
T. 11/28/06, pp. 118-127. 
T. 11/28/06, pp. 129 
2006 T., p. 128. 
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23. The cement wall between the parties' properties serves a dual purpose: it is 
the base of a fence that will ultimately extend three to six feet above the wall and a 
retaining wall.74 
24. At trial, Cache County Surveyor Preston Ward testified that he preferred the 
methodology used by Mr. Smith in performing the Smith Survey, that is, taking 
measurements and gathering information from inside the city block where the surveyed 
property lies, rather than going outside the block.75 Although not rejecting Mr. Ward's 
testimony entirely, the trial court minimized its persuasive impact on the court's findings 
when it accepted the Hansen Survey as the most persuasive survey.76 
25. It appears from the transcript of proceedings below that the trial court was 
very concerned about the conduct of the Calls' original counsel, Ray Malouf, in the 2 Vi-
day trial in the summer of 2004; the trial court went so far as to mention Rule 11 on the 
first day of the trial.77 
74
 2006 T., pp. 128, 129. 
75
 T. Vol. II, pp. 171-178. 
76
 2005 Findings, R. at 206-207, <H 88-91. 
77
 T. Vol. I, pp. 156-157 (The Court: "Sustained. Mr. Malouf, this testimony is not 
helpful, particularly given our discussion in chambers."), 159 (The Court: "That's 
inappropriate and in violation of Rule 11."); T. Vol. Ill, p. 113 (The Court: "I took Mr. 
Malouf in chambers and discussed with him some substantial concerns that were 
becoming very obvious, and I suspect counsel's a lot of money every day, and I suggested 
that resolution be sought at that time.") 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is a case in equity revolving around a boundary dispute. The trial court, using 
its considerable latitude and discretion in equitable matters, fashioned multiple equitable 
remedies, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances provided to the court 
during nearly five years of litigation below. This Court should not disturb the trial court's 
remedies. 
Mr. Seethaler failed to present to the trial court - and, hence, preserve - two 
claims: 1) that he was "irreparably harmed" and 2) that the trial court granted the Calls a 
de facto right of condemnation. Mr. Seethaler further failed to present to the trial court 
any request for - and any legal basis for - injunctive relief regarding removal of a cement 
wall constructed by the Calls. 
By presenting testimony of a surveyor as to the square footage of a small sliver of 
land that was on the Calls1 side of the cement wall and by presenting the testimony of a 
property appraiser as to the value of a square foot of the Seethaler Property, Mr. Seethaler 
invited the money damages he was awarded by the trial court in equity for loss of use of 
the small sliver of land. 
In his challenge to a finding of fact, Mr. Seethaler failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's finding that all the parties acted in good faith and none of the 
parties acted in bad faith. This Court should not reverse that finding. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Given its findings on the disputed boundary, the trial court crafted 
appropriate equitable remedies below. 
The Calls disagree with the trial court's core finding that the Crow Survey and the 
Hansen Survey are more reliable than the Smith Survey. Accordingly, the Calls disagree 
with the trial court's ultimate finding that their northern boundary is several feet short of 
the boundary determined by the Smith Survey. 
That said, the most important point the Calls want to make to this Court is that the 
trial court's findings and rulings under review were made in an equitable proceeding. As 
noted above, the trial court resolved multiple claims - pleaded and unpleaded - by the 
parties. The litigation below lasted nearly five years, was hard fought, involved multiple 
issues, and saw the Calls change counsel after the first 2 V2 days of trial. In the end - as 
so often happens in complicated cases in equity - parties on both sides of the lawsuit left 
the courthouse feeling aggrieved. The Calls, for example, have paid a total of $39,867 in 
court-awarded damages to Mr. Seethaler and the Emery plaintiffs for damages related to 
construction of a cement wall on their side of the boundary line determined by the Smith 
Survey. And Mr. Seethaler - despite having his own counsel draft all of the findings of 
fact, all of the conclusions of law and the three judgments and decrees issued by the trial 
court - is appealing one of the many findings of fact and one of the many equitable 
remedies crafted by the trial court to resolve this dispute. 
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The second most important point the Calls want to make is that the trial court 
fully understood its duties and responsibilities in formulating equitable remedies in 
the lawsuit below. The trial court's prelude to its rulings in the equity proceeding on 
November 28, 2006 began as follows: 
First, this is a case in equity. Equity means what is right 
and reasonable. What I'm called upon to do as the judge in this 
case is to decide what is right and reasonable. When I say right, I 
don't mean necessarily right under the law, what I mean is right in all 
of the circumstances considered. Practical, legal, financial, 
economical and recognizing properly rights. 
Property rights are unique. There's no question about it. 
There's only so much land in this world and every bit it is unique. 
Ownership of it is critically important to people. There are 
substantial, including constitutional, rights addressed by - affecting 
property rights. 
Having said that, one of the principles in equity is that 
those who seek equity must do equity. Allegations on both sides 
are that some of the parties have acted if in not bad faith, their 
actions were lacking in good faith. There is a difference between 
those two in the eyes of the law. Quite frankly, so much occurred 
here, so much lack of communication, so much self-interest, though 
not inappropriate self-interest. Things could have been done better 
but weren't. As a result of that, we have the mess we're in now. 
{Emphasis added.)n 
Both before and after the prelude, the trial court found that none of the parties had 
acted in bad faith and that all of the parties had acted in good faith.79 he court made its 
next significant ruling in equity on November 28, 2006: 
2006 T., pp. 144-145. 
2006 T., pp. 124, 139,145. 
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I'll first find that it is not equitable nor judicially appropriate to 
order removal of that wall. I'm not going to order it. I think 
that would be inequitable, inappropriate, economically 
unfeasible and unreasonable in every aspect. {Emphasis added./0 
The trial court explained its reasons for leaving the cement wall in place: 1) the 
high cost of removing and rebuilding the wall; 2) construction of the wall "has not 
resulted in a loss to [Mr.] Seethaler of any parking"; 3) the City of Logan could have been 
brought into the lawsuit as a party so the court could adjudicate Mr. Seethaler's rights vis-
a-vis the city regarding conforming or non-conforming uses (such as parking), but the city 
was never made a party; and 4) the wall is more "esthetieally pleasing" than the "broken 
down, tumbled down, dilapidated, deferred maintained fence with junk and garbage and 
trash accumulating, including vegetation dead and alive."81 
The starting point for this Court's analysis of the case law on equitable remedies is 
found in Ockey v. Lehmer:S2 
The availability of a remedy is a legal conclusion that we review for 
correctness. However, a trial court is accorded considerable latitude 
and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy, and 
[it] will not be overturned unless it [has] abused its discretion. 
2006 T, p. 146. 
2006 T., pp. 147-150. 
Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ^  42, 189 P.3d 51,61. 
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In the footnote to this quotation from the Ockey decision, the Supreme Court cited 
to Thurston v. Box Elder County^ as "holding that the availability of an equitable remedy 
is reviewed for correctness but that the trial court's application and formulation of an 
equitable remedy is reviewed for abuse of discretion." 
The fundamental question for this Court, then, is whether the trial court's 
decisions to (i) leave the cement wall in place, (ii) give the Calls use of a small sliver 
of land on their side of the wall, and (iii) compensate Mr, Seethaler with money 
damages are appropriate equitable remedies. 
The Supreme Court in Hughes v. Caffertyu provides excellent guidance in 
understanding a court of equity's broad authority to resolve disputes: 
All parties concede this is a case in equity, and equity 
cases afford courts discretion and latitude in fashioning 
equitable remedies. Although the court of appeals could have 
provided a more comprehensive opinion discussing all of the equities 
present in this case, it was not required to do so. A court acting in 
equity is not required to recite its decision in terms of specific factors 
or to adhere to formulaic tests. Rather, its obligation is to effectuate a 
result that serves equity given the overall facts and circumstances of 
the individual case. {Emphasis added.) 
In the footnote to the above quotation from the Hughes decision, the Supreme 
Court elaborated:85 
83
 Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1040-41 (UT 1995) {emphasis in 
original). 
84
 Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22,124, 89 P.3d 148, 153. 
85
 Id at fn. 2, quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (UT 1994). 
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Because decisions in equity are based on the overall facts and 
circumstances of each individual case, it is appropriate to give 
considerable deference to the trial court: 
[I]t is before [the trial] court that the witnesses and parties 
appear and the evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is 
therefore considered to be in the best position to assess the 
credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the 
proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot 
hope to garner from a cold record. 
Finally - in conjunction with its affirmation of the trial court's balancing the 
equities - the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Cafferty contrasted the confines of legal 
rulings with the flexibility of equitable rulings:86 
The distinguishing characteristics of legal remedies are their 
uniformity, their unchangeableness or fixedness, their lack of 
adaptation to circumstances, and the technical rules which govern 
their use.... Equitable remedies, on the other hand, are distinguished 
by their flexibility, their unlimited variety, [and] their adaptability to 
circumstances.... [T]he court of equity has the power of devising 
its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circumstances 
of every case and the complex relations of all the parties.87 
Each case presents unique facts and circumstances. What is 
relevant or persuasive in one equity decision may be meaningless in 
another context. "As in much else that pertains to equitable 
jurisdiction, individualization in the exercise of a discretionary 
power will alone retain equity as a living system and save it from 
sterility." {Emphasis added.)™ 
86
 Id at 2004 UT 22, ffl[ 26-27, 89 P.3d at 153-154. 
87
 Quoting Spencer W. Symons, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 109 (5th 
ed.1941). 
88
 Quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 
L.Ed. 1184(1939). 
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II. Mr. Seethaler did not preserve his claim of "irreparable harm," and he 
invited the remedy of money damages. 
Mr. Seethaler claims in his brief - for the first time ever - that he has suffered 
"irreparable harm" because the trial court did not order removal of the cement wall and 
the "monetary damages awarded by the trial court were not adequate to compensate [Mr.] 
Seethaler for the irreparable injury he suffered."89 
However, Mr. Seethaler did not raise his claim of "irreparable harm" before the 
trial court.90 As noted by this Court in Myrah v. Campbell:91 "In order to preserve an 
issue for appeal, it must be ... sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the 
trial court, and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority." 
In addition, Mr. Seethaler should not be heard to complain about receiving money 
damages for the Calls' use of the small sliver of land on their side of the cement wall. 
Mr. Seethaler himself is the one who produced all the evidence relied uipon by the 
trial court to award such monetary damages. In the November 28, 2006 equity 
proceeding, Mr. Seethaler presented the testimony of surveyor Jeff Hansen, who 
calculated for the trial court the amount of Mr. Seethaler's land on the Calls' side of the 
cement wall (including the wall): 612 square feet.92 Then Mr. Seethaler presented the 
89
 Brief of Appellant, p. 18. 
90
 R. at 1-487; T. Vols. I, II, III; 2006 T.; 4/2/2007 T.; 7/9/2007 T.; 11/19/2007 T. 
91
 Myrah v. Campbell 2007 UT App. 168, \ 18,163 P.3d 679, 683. 
92
 T. 11/28/06, pp. 43-45 
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testimony of property appraiser Tom Singleton, who testified to the market value of the 
small sliver of Mr. Seethaler's land on the Calls' side of the wall: $8900.93 Mr. Singleton 
even testified that he valued the Seethaler Property at $13 per square foot using a 
"methodology" he uses for determining the value of this property in a "taking."94 Mr. 
Singleton also testified to the tax rate that would be used to calculate Mr. Seethaler's taxes 
on the sliver of land: $21.60 per year.95 
If Mr. Seethaler did not want the trial court to award money damages for the small 
sliver of his property on the Calls' side of the wall, he should not have presented evidence 
leading the court directly to that remedy. 
Moreover, "irreparable harm" is a term of art in equity. Regarding "irreparable 
harm," The Supreme Court in Johnson v. Hermes Associates, LTD stated:96 
"Irreparable harm," a term often interchanged with "irreparable 
injury," is defined as "a harm that a court would be unable to remedy 
even if the movant would prevail in the final adjudication." We have 
also explained that irreparable injury consists of "wrongs of a 
repeated and continuing character, or which occasion damages that 
are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard." 
A party proves irreparable injury when establishing that "he or she is 
unlikely to be made whole by an award of monetary damages or 
93
 2006 T., pp. 64-74. 
94
 2006 T., pp. 65-70. 
95
 2006 T., pp. 74-75. 
96
 Johnson v. Hermes Associates, LTD, 2005 UT 82, f 18 128 P.3d 1151,1157, 
quoting 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 33 (2004); citing 13 Moore's Federal Practice § 
65.06[2] (3d ed.2005) and Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, f 29, 37 P.3d 1112. 
It 
some other legal, as opposed to equitable, remedy.... Thus, an injury 
is irreparable if the damages are estimable only by conjecture and not 
by any accurate standard." 
Given that Mr. Seethaler himself presented the trial court with all the evidence 
necessary to calculate reasonably accurate monetary damages for loss of use of 612 
square feet of real property along the wall, Mr. Seethaler cannot prove that he is 
irreparably harmed by leaving the cement wall in place and spending - or investing - the 
money damages he has already received from the Calls.97 
III. Mr. Seethaler's cases do not support his assertion that he is entitled to a 
different form of equitable relief. 
Mr. Seethaler cites a number of cases in support of his position that he is entitled 
to different equitable relief than what he was granted below: Strawberry Electric Service 
District v. Spanish Fork City,98 Carrier v. Lundquist," Systems Concepts, Inc. v. 
Dixon,100and Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center 
Associates,101 The problem is, all of these are injunction cases. And Mr. Seethaler 
97
 R. 461-462. 
98
 Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P,2d 870 (UT 
1996). 
99
 Carrier v. Lundquist, 2001 UT 105, 37 P.3d 1112. 
100
 Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (UT 1983) 
101
 Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 
535 P.2d 1256 (UT 1975). 
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never sought injunctive relief in the court below.102 Mr. Seethaler never provided the 
trial court an opportunity to inquire into whether he would truly suffer irreparable harm if 
the cement wall were allowed to remain. Indeed, in the year between the construction of 
the cement wall along the Emery Property and the construction of the cement wall along 
the Seethaler Property, Mr. Seethaler did not seek injunctive relief- which was an 
available remedy if Mr. Seethaler indeed thought he would be irreparably harmed.103 
After the plaintiffs filed their Complaint, Mr. Seethaler did not seek injunctive relief. 
Again, this would have been an available remedy. Then, at the November 28, 2006 
equity hearing, Mr. Seethaler presented evidence in support of monetary damages. 
Even after the November 28, 2006 equity hearing in which the trial court ordered 
the equitable remedies now under review, Mr. Seethaler did not request the trial court to 
reconsider and grant him the injunctive relief he is now asking this Court to grant him. 
There was an additional 14 months of litigation in this matter after the November 28, 
2006 equity hearing - including the plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Judgment and to Limit 
Bench Ruling or for Reconsideration104 - but that additional litigation involved spruce 
trees on the Emery Property, not injunctive relief. 
102
 R. at 1-487; T. Vols. I, II, III; 2006 T.; 4/2/2007 T.; 7/9/2007 T.; 11/19/2007 T. 
103
 Hunsaker v. Kersh, 991 P.2d 67, 69 ("A preliminary injunction is 'an 
anticipatory remedy purposed to prevent the perpetration of a threatened wrong or to 
compel the cessation of a continuing one.' It further serves to "preserve the status quo 
pending the outcome of the case. "){Citations ommitted.) 
104
 R. at pp. 340-363. 
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Only on appeal - after seeking and receiving monetary damages from the trial 
court - does Mr. Seethaler decide that he would prefer a different form of equitable relief, 
that is, injunctive relief ordering removal of the cement wall because of alleged 
irreparable harm. By failing to raise the issue below, Mr. Seethaler waived any claim he 
may have had to injunctive relief, or he at least failed to preserve the issue.105 
Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe the trial court would have ruled any 
differently had it applied the "balancing of equities" test now advocated by Mr. Seethaler. 
As explained by the Supreme Court in Carrier v. Lundquist:106 
Under this test, the district court may in its discretion elect not 
to grant an injunction only "where an encroachment does not 
irreparably injure the plaintiff; was innocently made; the cosl of 
removal would be disproportionate and oppressive compared to the 
benefits derived from it, and plaintiff can be compensated by 
damages." {Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) 
The facts of this case would likely satisfy the balancing of equities test in the Calls' 
favor had the trial court been given the opportunity to apply such a test. First, there was 
no claim or finding below that Mr. Seethaler would be irreparably harmed by leaving the 
wall in place. Indeed, the trial court specifically found:107 
Myrah v. Campbell 2007 UT App. 168,1j 18,163 P.3d 679, 683. 
Carrier v. Lundquist, 2001 UT 105,131,37 P.3d 1112, 120-121. 
2006 T., p. 147. 
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Additionally, the building of the wall and the eventual building of a 
fence on top of it, which has been anticipated and reflected in the 
testimony, has not resulted in a loss to Seethaler of any parking. All 
the spaces are still there. 
Second, while the Calls were certainly aware of Mr. Seethaler's boundary concerns 
as early as April 11, 2002, six months earlier the Smith Survey had established a 
definitive boundary, which Mr. Smith himself explained to Messers. Seethaler and Emery 
in the spring of 2002.108 Only after a year of waiting for a boundary resolution and 
consulting with his legal counsel and Logan City officials, did Mr. Call go forward with 
construction of the wall along the Seethaler boundary.109 
Third, the trial court addressed the issue of cost of removing the wall in its ruling 
on November 28, 2006:110 
I'll first find that it is not equitable nor judicially appropriate 
to order removal of that wall. I'm not going to order it. I think that 
would be inequitable, inappropriate, economically unfeasible and 
unreasonable in every aspect. . . . 
Whether it's [$]1900 or [$]2400 or [$] 18,000 or [$] 19,000 
makes little difference. To remove [the wall] and reinstall it for the 
purposes that Mr. Call wants would be another [$] 15,000 to build the 
thing again. So you double the cost of that, plus the added cost to 
remove it, so you're in the area of probably $30,000. That makes no 
sense. It is unreasonable and inequitable and I so find. 
108
 2006 T., p. 31-32, 118, 
109T. Vol. I, p. 64; 2006 T, pp. 31, 106, 110, 118-129. 
110
 2006 T., p. 146-147. 
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Finally, the trial court was able to accurately calculate Mr. Seethaler's damages for 
the Calls' use of the sliver of land, using Mr. Seethaler's own witnesses - who presumably 
testified for just that purpose. As to the Calls' occupancy of the sliver of the Seethaler 
Property, the trial court ruled:111 
As I said, there's been a loss of land by occupancy now of the 
defendant, and which will continue to be occupied by him by my 
decision in equity. That is by the Hansen survey 612 square feet of 
plaintiff Seethaler land and 400 square feet of plaintiff Emery land. 
By the Singleton calculations, that's $8900 in favor of plaintiff 
Seethaler and $6750 in favor of plaintiff Emery. I award judgments 
in those amounts. 
Now, there's the tax issue which I asked Mr. Singleton about. 
The taxes on the Seethaler portion of the property now occupied by 
the defendant is $21.60 a year. That's expected to increase. But over 
20 years that would be $432. I'm awarding judgment in favor of 
Seethaler for $500 for taxes which he'll have to pay against property 
that he does not have beneficial use of. 
It is also important to emphasize that the balancing of equities test on which Mr. 
Seethaler now hangs his hat does not require the trial court to order removal of the wall 
even if it had found that the Calls don't satisfy the test: "Where the encroachment is 
deliberate and constitutes a wilful and intentional taking of another's land, equity may 
require its restoration, without regard for the relative inconveniences or hardships which 
may result from its removal."112 
111
 2006 T., p. 156. 
112
 Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 
535 P.2d 1256 (UT 197'5)(emphasis added). 
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IV. The Calls are not responsible for Mr. Seethalerfs parking problems. 
In attempting to prove irreparable harm to this Court, Mr. Seethaler's brief 
discusses at length Mr. Seethaler's parking problems and aesthetical concerns, which he 
attributes to the cement wall.113 A few points should be made. First, regarding his 
possible loss of parking spaces because of Logan City's road plans, Mr. Seethaler 
testified: 
Q. Still showing a loss of 30 stalls and Mr. Call had 
nothing to do with that; is that right? 
A. Right, he had nothing to do with that. These issues are 
related to me, but they obviously have a lot of different aspects to 
them and Mr. Call did not cause this. 
Second, the trial court specifically addressed the aesthetics of the cement wall in 
its ruling:114 
I would suggest, frankly, given the history of this case, given 
the photographs I've seen and so forth, that that wall is far more 
esthetically pleasing than what was there before. There was a broken 
down, tumbled down, dilapidated, deferred maintained fence with 
junk and garbage and trash accumulating, including vegetation dead 
and alive. Nothing had been done to beautify that side of the 
property. If nothing else this wall does that. 
Finally, the plaintiffs began the November 28, 2006 equity proceeding by 
introducing into evidence Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, which is an aerial photograph of the 
113
 Brief of Appellant, pp. 20-26. 
114
 2006 T., p. 150. 
32 
parking situation at Mr. Seethaler's apartments as of the hearing date.115 As testified to by 
Mr. Seethaler, there is a black line on Exhibit 1 showing the location of Mr. Seethaler's 
property line as determined by the Hansen Survey and accepted by the trial court in the 
summer 2004 trial.116 As acknowledged by Mr. Seethaler on cross examination, the 
northern boundary of the Seethaler Property does not even extend to the sidewalk running 
along the north side of that parcel:117 
Q. So my point is, Mr. Seethaler, that the north side of 
your property doesn't even go to the sidewalk as it currently exists; is 
that right? 
A. Umm, very likely. I don't want to say absolutely that I 
know that to be true, but very possible. 
The Calls propose there is a simple explanation for the gap between northern end 
of the Seethaler Property and the city sidewalk to the north. That is, the Hansen Survey 
effectively shifted the Seethaler Property to the south, leaving the gap. The original 
property description of the Seethaler Property as set forth in the Complaint provided 
300.32 feet along the eastern edge of the Seethaler Property.118 The Hansen Survey -
which was adopted by the trial court and included in the original Judgment and Decree 
issued by the trial court - also provides 300.32 feet along the eastern edge of the 
115
 2006 T., p. 3-4. 
116
 2006 T., pp. 37-39; see also 2005 Judgment, R. at 193, f 5(c) for the new legal 
description of the Seethaler Property. 
117
 2006 T., p. 39 
118
 R. at 4 ,^ 4. 
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Seethaler Property.119 
In contrast, Mr. Smith testified at trial that the Smith Survey provided the foil 
amount of real property described in the metes and bounds descriptions of the deeds to the 
four parcels (two Emery parcels, the Seethaler Property and the Call Property) that are 
affected by this boundary dispute.120 Mr. Smith also testified that under the Smith Survey 
"the deeds fit along the sidewalk on Canyon Road" (to the north of the Seethaler 
Property) and the "north adjoining deeds . . . could fit within the block."121 Finally, Mr. 
Smith testified that between the Smith Survey and 1993 Crow Survey there is a 
difference of approximately 2 lA feet on the eastern boundary between the Seethaler 
Property and the Call Property.122 This is the "deficiency" in deeded property that 
prompted Mr. Call in November 2001 to request the Smith Survey in the first place.123 
V. Mr. Seethaler did not marshal the evidence to support his challenge to a key finding 
of fact that all the parties acted in good faith. 
If Mr. Seethaler wants to successfully challenge the trial court's finding of fact that 
the parties acted in good faith and none acted in bad faith, then he must marshal evidence 
in support of that finding: 
119
 2005 Judgment, R. at 193, \ 5(c). 
120
 T. Vol. II, pp. 142-143. 
121
 T. Vol. II, pp. 154, 156. 
122
 T. Vol. II, p. 144. 
123
 T. Vol. I, p. 129, 136. 
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To successfully challenge an ultimate finding of fact, "an 
appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to 
the court below."124 
Mr. Seethaler did not marshal the evidence in his brief. Rather, he relentlessly 
maintained the same drumbeat throughout his brief: Bad, bad, bad, bad, bad Mr. Call! 
However, had Mr. Seethaler marshaled the evidence, he would have recognzied, among 
other evidence presented to the trial court, that: 
• In the fall of 2001, Mr. Call commissioned the Smith Survey, which 
resulted in the surveyed boundary being staked out in November 2001 - before the old 
fence was removed and the trench dug for construction of the wall.125 
• Mr. Call testified that, in retaining Mr. Smith to conduct the Smith Survey, 
Mr. Call did not instruct Mr. Smith to find a particular boundary line on the north side of 
the Call Property.126 Rather, Mr. Call noted that the 1993 Crow Survey appeared to 
follow a fence line on the north side of the Call Property and the Crow Survey left the 
Call Property with approximately 2 feet less property than was called out in the metes and 
bounds description of the warranty deed to the Call Property that Mr. Call's mother had 
124
 Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, \ 25, 112 P.3d 495, 502, quoting Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^  76, 100 P.3d 1177. 
125
 T. Vol. I, p. 129, 136; 2006 T., pp. 102-103. 
126
 T. Vol. II, pp. 136, 140-156; 2006 T. pp. 103-104. 
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mother had executed in favor of the Calls.127 (Which deed was incidentally prepared by 
the law firm of Mr. Seethaler's counsel, in case there are any concerns about the standard 
reservations listed in the deed after the property description.)128 Mr. Call requested that 
Mr. Smith find the property lines as set forth in the parties' respective deeds and take the 
deficiency, if any was found to exist, from the Call Property.129 
• In November 2001, Mr. Smith staked out the northern boundary of the Call 
Property as he had determined it to be from his survey that month.130 Mr. Smith testified 
at trial that the Smith Survey provided the full amount of real property described in the 
metes and bounds descriptions of the deeds to the four parcels that are directly affected by 
this boundary dispute.131 
• There was considerable conflict in the testimony at trial about the location 
of the old boundary-line cedar fence and whether there was a second, newer fence that 
had been constructed south (on the Calls' side) of the old fence. Mr. Call testified that in 
the 1980s his family (which then owned the Call Property) had constructed a new fence 
south of the original fence, and it was that fence that was incorrectly used in the Crow 
7
 T. Vol. I, pp. 129, 135 ; T. Vol. II, p. 142. 
8
 The deed is Plaintiffs' Ex. 32; see 2007 Interim Findings, R. 313, f 7. 
9
 T. Vol. I, pp. 135-136, T. Vol. II, pp. 142-143; 2006 T., pp. 103-104. 
°T 11/28/07, p. 26-27, 54 
1
 T. Vol. II, pp. 142-143. 
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Survey to determine the boundary line.132 In addition, Logan City Building Inspector 
John Chase, concrete contractor Steve Johnson and Mr. Call all testified at trial that there 
was evidence of old fence posts in the trench Mr. Call dug for the footings for the cement 
wall at issue.133 
• On April 11, 2002 - when he was notified by Messrs. Emery and Seethaler 
that they believed the cement wall was not on the Call Property and that there were 
drainage issues that must be resolved - Mr. Call ceased all work on his apartment project 
at the north side of the Call Property so that he could resolve these issues with Messrs. 
Seethaler and Emery.134 
• Mr. Call arranged a meeting on May 13, 2002 between Mr. Emery, Mr. 
Seethaler, Mr. Smith and himself to discuss the results of the Smith Survey and the 
northern boundary of the Call Property. 
• Except for receiving loads of fill dirt in June 2002, Mr. Call did not perform 
any work on his apartment project until September 2002 because he was waiting to 
resolve the boundary dispute with Messrs. Seethaler and Emery, who never made any 
proposals or effort to resolve the dispute during the summer of 2002.135 
132T.Vol.I,pp.l51-156. 
133
 T. Vol I, pp 151-157 ;T. Vol. II, pp. 119, 122, 125-126, 132-136. 
134
 2006 T., p. 118. 
135
 T. 11/28/06, pp. 118-127. 
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• In March 2003, Mr. Call constructed the portion of the cement wall between 
the Call Property and the Seethaler Property.136 Before constructing that part of the 
cement wall - all of which was inside the boundary set by the Smith Survey but outside 
boundary set by the Hansen Survey - Mr. Call consulted with his then-attorney, Ray 
Malouf, and officials with the Logan City.137 
• Mr. Call offered to help Mr. Seethaler move a storage shed that Mr. Call 
believed was encroaching on the Call Property.138 
Accordingly, Mr. Seethaler's challenge to the trial court's finding of fact that all 
parties acted in good faith should be denied. 
VI. Mr. Seethaler did not preserve his claim of de facto condemnation. 
Once again, Mr. Seethaler claims - for the first time ever on appeal - that the trial 
court granted the Calls a de facto right to condemn a sliver of the Seethaler Property. As 
noted by this Court in Myrah v. Campbell:139 "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it 
must be ... sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court, and must 
be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority." 
T. 11/28/06, pp. 129 
2006T.,p.l28. 
T. Vol. I, p. 48. 
Myrah v. Campbell, 2007 UT App. 168, ^  18,163 P.3d 679, 683. 
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In addition, it should be noted that on November 28, 2006 the trial court granted 
two equitable remedies involving a party using another party's land. As Mr. Seethaler has 
emphasized, repeatedly, the trial court awarded the Calls occupancy of a small sliver of 
land south of the cement wall - much like a 20-year lease.140 At the same time, the trial 
court awarded the Emery Plaintiffs a "perpetual easement" to one of the parking spaces 
on the Call Property to compensate for the Emery plaintiffs' loss of a parking space when 
the wall was constructed.141 
CONCLUSION 
There is no good legal or equitable reason for this Court to reverse the trial court 
on any of the findings it made or any of the equitable remedies it granted. This was a 
difficult case, by any measure. Mr. Seethaler is simply asking this Court to substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court, which sat through days of trials and hearings, waded 
through scores of exhibits, reviewed scores of pages of pleadings, motions and 
memoranda, and then did the best it could to formulate appropriate and workable 
equitable remedies. 
Another judge might have crafted somewhat different remedies, but that is nearly 
always the case in equitable proceedings. (Indeed, another judge might have accepted the 
Smith Survey as being the most accurate and reliable survey and dismissed the plaintiffs' 
140
 2007 Interim Decree, R. at 433, f 6. 
141
 2007 Interim Findings, R. at 440, f 19; 2007 Interim Decree, R. at 433, f 10. 
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claims of boundary by acquiescence.) Mr. Seethaler certainly would like to see this Court 
order removal of the cement wall. The Calls would like to think that had their original 
lawyer proceeded differently early in this case, there might have been an entirely different 
result. But it is time to end this litigation and let the parties move on with their lives. 
Among the many reasons why Utah appellate courts apply the "abuse of discretion" 
standard to cases: 
The abuse of discretion standard recognizes both the district court's 
ability to balance facts and craft equitable remedies and our 
hesitance to act as a Monday morning quarterback in such matters.142 
The judgments and decrees on appeal should be affirmed. 
Dated this / Z ' d a y of September, 2008. 
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